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As the introduction of ﬁnancial transaction taxes is increasingly discussed by political
leaders we explore possible consequences such taxes could have on markets. Here we
examine how ‘‘stylized facts’’, namely fat tails and volatility clustering, are affected by
different tax regimes in laboratory experiments. We ﬁnd that leptokurtosis of price
returns is highest and clustered volatility is weakest in unilaterally taxed markets
(where tax havens exist). Instead, tails are slimmest and volatility clustering is
strongest in tax havens. When an encompassing ﬁnancial transaction tax is levied,
stylized facts hardly change compared to a scenario with no tax on all markets.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2009 and the European debt crisis since 2010 the debate over the introduction of
ﬁnancial transaction taxes (FTT, a Tobin tax being the most prominent example for foreign exchange markets) got new
impulses and new supporters. Especially in the EU, where chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany is the most outspoken
advocate, the implementation of such a tax has become far from unthinkable. Whenever such major changes to markets are
seriously considered it seems prudent to explore – as far as possible – consequences this could cause in affected markets. In this
paper we do this by means of laboratory experiments. By exposing human traders to markets that mimic the key elements of
the markets under consideration, we try to capture the main consequences that could result from this tax regime change.
The idea of a FTT has gained popularity as an instrument to reduce speculation and stabilize ﬁnancial markets
especially since the seminal work of Tobin (1978). Its originally intended effects include a decrease in volatility and an
increase in market efﬁciency, as speculators (noise traders) are forced to reduce trading frequency. Scientiﬁc research on
the impact of FTTs has mainly started in the 1990s with contributions by e.g. Stiglitz (1989), Summers and Summers
(1989), Schwert and Seguin (1993), Jones and Seguin (1997), Subrahmanyam (1998), Dow and Rahi (2000), and Baltagi, Department of Banking and Finance, Universita¨tsstrasse 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria.
ber), daniel.kleinlercher@uibk.ac.at (D. Kleinlercher), michael.kirchler@uibk.ac.at (M. Kirchler).
the Austrian Academy of Science.
Y-NC-ND license.
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and market shares of taxed markets (compared to untaxed ones). Empirically, the decrease in trading volume is usually
quite substantial when a ﬁnancial transaction tax is introduced.1 Other issues, notably price volatility and market
efﬁciency are still controversially and hotly debated. In general, studies which use agent-based models with either
boundedly rational agents (i.e., chartist/fundamentalist approach) or with zero-intelligence traders mainly report lower
price volatility as a reaction to the imposition of a FTT (e.g., Westerhoff, 2003; Ehrenstein et al., 2005; Westerhoff and
Dieci, 2006). Instead, empirical studies either look at historical examples of FTTs or indirectly measure FTTs as increased
transaction costs. They mainly report no or a positive relationship of transaction costs and price volatility when different
types of FTTs were imposed (e.g., Aliber et al., 2003; Hau, 2006).
The effects of FTTs have also been investigated in the laboratory. Hanke et al. (2010) report increased volatility in small
unilaterally taxed markets when tax havens exist. Due to a shift in liquidity, volatility decreases in the tax haven at the
same time. Kirchler et al. (2012) investigate the impact of market microstructure on the effects of FTTs.2 Similarly to Hanke
et al. (2010) they observe that volatility increases in unilaterally taxed markets without market makers, whereas it
decreases when market makers provide permanent liquidity in unilaterally taxed markets. Importantly, both experimental
studies report that an encompassing Tobin tax has no impact on volatility and market efﬁciency compared to a regime
with no tax. Recently, a comprehensive survey on the impact and feasibility of the Tobin tax and FTTs has been published
by McCulloch and Pacillo (2011). They review related scientiﬁc contributions since the 1970s and conclude that a Tobin tax
is feasible and would generate substantial revenues without causing major distortions to market efﬁciency and price
volatility. The latter is unlikely to decrease and could even increase.
In this paper we extend the body of literature by focusing on another implication of a FTT which has not been
investigated so far—the impact of a FTT on so called ‘‘stylized facts’’ of price returns. As mentioned, the introduction of a
FTT has effects on market liquidity, trading volume and price returns. In ﬁnancial markets the distribution of the latter
usually displays excess kurtosis (‘‘fat tails’’ or leptokurtosis) and the time series is heteroscedastic (‘‘volatility clustering’’).
These stylized facts are universal to ﬁnancial markets and have been found in laboratory experiments as well.3 As the
implementation of a FTT has an impact on price returns, it is possible that stylized facts are affected as well.
To shed light on this issue we explore changes in leptokurtosis and volatility clustering in laboratory markets with
different tax regimes. In each session two double auction markets for the same currency pair run simultaneously and a FTT is
introduced in none, one, or both markets (i.e. no FTT on both markets; unilateral FTT, the other market being the tax haven;
encompassing FTT). By using two simultaneously running markets we account for potential tax avoidance which allows us to
analyze the impact of a FTT in unilaterally, and in comprehensively taxed markets, as well as in tax havens. Furthermore, we
use two different microstructures that dominate real markets: (i) exchanges where market makers ensure permanent
liquidity and (ii) over-the-counter markets where trading happens between individual parties without market makers. Some
segments at real-world exchanges like at the CME and the LIFFE are examples of the former, while electronic trading
platforms for currencies like EBS and Reuters3000 as well as the international money markets are examples of the latter. The
choice of this speciﬁc setting is inspired by Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) which point out the high importance of market
microstructure when a FTT is levied. If a FTT is imposed, they report a reduction in volatility in dealership markets where
market makers provide permanent liquidity compared to a double-auction setting without market makers. Consequently,
two treatments, Treatment ‘‘over the counter’’ (OTC) and Treatment ‘‘trading requirement’’ (TR), use the latter and Treatment
‘‘market maker’’ (MM) is applied with the former market microstructure. There are no speciﬁc limitations or requirements to
trade in Treatment OTC, where each subject can post limit and market orders. With all other things being equal to Treatment
OTC half of the subjects have a trading requirement in Treatment TR, i.e. a minimum amount of trading they have to carry
out in each period to avoid a penalty. Instead, in Treatment MM computerized market makers provide a constant liquidity
ﬂow, while human subjects can only post market orders, i.e. accept limit orders posted by market makers.
We ﬁnd leptokurtosis of the distribution of returns under each tax regime. The following results hold for each
treatment: (i) fat tails are largest and signiﬁcantly larger in unilaterally taxed markets compared to most other tax
regimes, while they are smallest in tax havens. Furthermore, (ii) we report clustered volatility under most tax regimes,
most prominently in the tax havens. Instead, (iii) the autocorrelation function (ACF) of normalized absolute returns decays
very quickly towards zero in unilaterally taxed markets, i.e. there are no volatility clusters in this tax regime. This ﬁnding is
caused by the low trading frequency in unilaterally taxed markets since intervals of hectic trading, which are the main
volatility clusters, almost never occur. Finally, (iv) we observe hardly any changes in leptokurtosis and volatility clustering
when an encompassing FTT is applied in comparison to both markets being untaxed.
The importance of investigating price return distributions under different tax regimes is straightforward. For instance,
the pricing of options and other structured products depends on the underlying distribution of returns. Fatter tails under a1 For example, volume fell by more than 30% after an existing transaction tax of 0.1% was increased to 0.3% on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in May
2007. In Sweden the introduction of a FTT of 0.5% in 1984 led to the markets for futures and for bills to dry up almost completely and more than half of
share trading to move abroad, mostly to London (Umlauf, 1993).
2 Two of the three treatments we analyze here are also included in their paper, though with a different research focus.
3 See e.g. Mandelbrot (1963), Mandelbrot and Taylor (1967), Cont (1997), Plerou et al. (1999), Mantegna and Stanley (2000), Bouchaud and Potters
(2001) for literature on stylized facts in general and Plott and Sunder (1982), Scalas et al. (2006), Kirchler and Huber (2009) for stylized facts in laboratory
experiments.
Table 1
Tax rate scenarios within each treatment.
Tax rate scenario Periods 1–5 Periods 6–10
LEFT (%) RIGHT (%) LEFT (%) RIGHT (%)
0L – – 0.1 –
02 – – 0.1 0.1
L0 0.1 – – –
L2 0.1 – 0.1 0.1
20 0.1 0.1 – –
2L 0.1 0.1 0.1 –
Entries show the two-way tax rate (0.1% for each side) for taxed markets, dashes indicate the absence of taxes.
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similar derivatives and structured products that ‘‘insure’’ tail events, could become more expensive. Thus, we urge that any
nation should tread carefully when contemplating the unilateral introduction of a FTT, as the costs for anyone trying to
insure (with options and similar derivatives) would likely go up. A universal (encompassing) implementation of a FTT,
however, would have hardly any negative effects on the fat tail and the volatility clustering property compared to the
status quo. The latter implies that international coordination for implementing FTTs is a necessary condition to avoid
distorting effects for the distribution of returns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details on market design, experimental
treatments, and experimental implementation. Section 3 outlines the econometric method. Section 4 presents the results
from the experiments and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. Design of the experiment
The framing we used for our experiments was trading in currencies (see instructions in Appendix), but it could be any
asset. As a useful preliminary to understand the setup, we provide the following deﬁnitions: In this paper a phase is a
sequence of ﬁve trading periods where a certain tax rate scenario is applied. Eachmarket consists of two phases and is thus
10 periods long. A session consists of two markets (denoted LEFT and RIGHT and placed accordingly on the screen; see
screenshots in Appendix), where traders can act on both markets simultaneously.4 A tax rate scenario deﬁnes when and on
which markets within a session a two-way ﬁnancial transaction tax (FTT) of 0.1% is implemented (possibilities: tax LEFT
only; tax LEFT and RIGHT; no tax on both markets).5 Every treatment is associated with a speciﬁc market microstructure
and within each treatment we model six different tax rate scenarios (see Table 1). We conduct two sessions of each tax
rate scenario in Treatments OTC and TR and four sessions in Treatment MM).
2.1. Market setup
In each session a different cohort of 16 (Treatments OTC and TR) or 8 (Treatment MM) human subjects trade currency A
for currency B on two markets (LEFT and RIGHT). Both markets are displayed on the trading screen at the same time and
traders can be active on both markets simultaneously. Buying a currency on one market and selling it on the other is
possible, as is buying on both markets or selling on both markets.
The fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B) is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion without drift
FVk ¼ FVk1  egk , ð1Þ
where FVk is the fundamental value in period k and gk is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of 5%. FV0 is set to 60. We draw one fundamental value path randomly (path I) and its counterpart
mirrored at the unconditional expected value of FV is used as path II. For each tax rate scenario in each treatment two (four
in Treatment MM) sessions are run, half with path I, the other with path II.
We use a symmetric information structure where at the beginning of each period each subject receives a private signal
(SIGNAL) on the fundamental value of currency A. This signal is the FV plus a noise term with a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of 2.5%. To ensure that ‘‘the market’’ has an unbiased estimate of the FV estimation errors cancel out
across subjects in each period.64 We consciously chose generic currencies and places to avoid possible inﬂuences due to preferences of subjects.
5 With a two-way FTT both seller and buyer have to pay the tax rate of 0.1% of the transaction value. Hanke et al. (2010) point out that tax rates of
0.5% and 0.1% yield almost identical results in a very similar laboratory setting. We use 0.1% as it is closer to the numbers currently discussed by
politicians and academics.
6 This is implemented by drawing positive estimation errors for half of the subjects and using the respective negative error terms for the other half of
the subjects.
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fundamental value FV0 of 60 B per A each trader’s initial wealth equals 6000 B. The holdings in A and B are carried over
from one period to the next and short positions are possible up to 100 (6000) units of A (B). No interest is paid in either
currency.
On the trading screen subjects are continuously informed about all open limit orders, their own holdings of both
currencies, their trades in the current period, and their wealth. The latter is calculated as the sum of their B holdings and
the value of their A holdings. A real-time chart provides subjects with the development of prices of both markets.
Each trading period ends after 4 min. Then subjects receive a summary of the trading activities of all previous periods in
a ‘‘history screen’’ which is displayed for 10 s. It contains information on the closing prices, individual and total trading
volumes and the amount of taxes paid in currency B (only if applicable) for each market. Furthermore, the holdings of A
and B, trader’s wealth, his estimate of the fundamental value (SIGNAL) and a chart of mean market prices of both markets
are displayed (see screenshots in Appendix for more details).
2.2. Experimental procedure
Before trading starts subjects have 15 min to read written instructions. Questions are answered privately. Then the
trading screen is explained and two trial periods are conducted which have no inﬂuence on the ﬁnal payment. To avoid
strategic behavior towards the end of the experiment, subjects are told that the experiment will end between periods 8
and 14 with equal probability.
2.3. Tax rate scenarios
Table 1 presents the tax rate scenarios used in each of the three treatments. The tax rate scenarios differ with respect to
when and on which markets a (two-way) FTT of 0.1% of the transaction value (units of A traded multiplied by price in B) is
levied.
In particular, each session consists of two phases of ﬁve periods each where a different tax rate scenario is implemented
in each phase. Hence, the treatment abbreviations in Table 1 are to be read as follows: the numbers ‘‘0’’ and ‘‘2’’ specify
whether no market (‘‘0’’) or both markets (‘‘2’’) are taxed. When only one market is taxed, we chose to tax only the left
market (‘‘L’’) to reduce the number of possible scenarios. In this case the right market is referred to as tax haven. For
instance, under tax rate scenario 2L the tax is introduced on both markets in the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, but is levied only on the
LEFT market in periods 6–10.7 Before the beginning of the ﬁrst and the sixth period subjects are informed about the
imposition of a tax with an announcement screen. This screen explains in detail which markets are taxed and provides a
calculation example for taxation. Subjects do not get any information about the potential implementation of transaction
taxes before the main experiment starts and they are not informed whether and when the tax regime is changed again.
Once introduced, the tax rate is also placed on the trading screen.
2.4. Experimental treatments
In total we ran 48 sessions; 12 each of Treatments OTC and TR with 16 human subjects each, and 24 sessions of
Treatment MM, each with 8 humans and 2 computerized agents.8 This results in 96 markets in total (one LEFT and one
RIGHT market in each session). All 576 subjects were business or economics students at the University of Innsbruck,
recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).9 Sessions were computerized (using zTree 3.2.8 by Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted
about 90 min.
2.4.1. Treatment 1: over-the-counter—OTC
Subjects trade in a continuous double auction market and can post limit and market orders. Limit orders (bids and asks)
are executed according to price and then time priority.10 Market orders have priority over limit orders and are always
executed instantaneously.11 The order books are open which means that limit orders are visible to all subjects at the same
time. Any order size and the partial execution of limit orders is possible as long as the endowments in A and B are above
100 and 6000, respectively. The cancellation of orders is not possible. Order books are emptied, i.e. all orders deleted,
before the beginning of a new period. All this is public knowledge.7 With two market phases and three tax regimes, we achieve a perfectly balanced structure, since we implement all possible permutations of ‘‘0’’,
‘‘2’’, and ‘‘L’’. Hence, each tax regime shows up equally often in the ﬁrst and in the second half within all sessions of a treatment. This structure offers the
beneﬁt that ordering effects of tax regimes cancel out.
8 As subjects did not have to post limit orders in Treatment MM, we reduced the number of human traders to 8 to achieve better comparability to
Treatments OTC and TR. It turned out that trading volumes were very similar across the three treatments.
9 Given their curriculum they understand standard deviations and the stochastic process used to model the FV.
10 To post a limit order traders have to specify price and quantity they want to trade for with the risk that the limit order will not be accepted by
another trader.
11 To post a market order traders have to specify only the quantity they want to trade for with immediate execution at the price of the best limit
order in the market.
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The market setup of Treatment TR is an exact replication of Treatment OTC with the only difference that eight of the 16
traders have a trading requirement of 1000 units of B (roughly 17% of their initial wealth) per period. Four of the traders
have to fulﬁll this volume requirement on the LEFT market, the other four on the RIGHT market. If a trader does not fulﬁll
his trading requirement in a given period a penalty of 500 B was deducted from his account. The remaining eight traders
have no trading requirement. With this treatment we capture the real-world situation that some traders cannot freely
switch between FX-markets or have to trade for bona-ﬁde commercial reasons. Both treatments, OTC and TR, mimic real-
world FX trading platforms like EBS and Reuters3000.
2.4.3. Treatment 3: market makers–MM
There are no trading requirements in Treatment MM, but this treatment deviates from Treatment OTC in one crucial
aspect: all limit orders are provided by artiﬁcial market makers. Subjects can thus only place market orders, i.e. accept
limit orders set by the market makers. To achieve a constant liquidity inﬂow we implement one computerized market
maker in each market (similar to Pellizzari and Westerhoff, 2009).12 Every several seconds (see process and parameters
below) a market maker places both a bid and an ask at time t
BIDk,t ¼ Pk,t9Ek,t9þdk,t ,
ASKk,t ¼ Pk,tþ9Ek,t9þdk,t : ð2Þ
Here Pk,t denotes the last transaction price at time t in period k and 9Ek,t9 is the absolute value of a standard normally
distributed random variable. With this setting, market makers react to changes in demand and supply by human traders.
For instance, if prices go up (through excess demand), market makers increase their bids and asks. Note that market
makers do not process any fundamental information. Thus price levels and market efﬁciency are driven only by the actions
of the human subjects. In real markets market makers usually try to keep their long- and short-positions balanced, i.e. have
a net exposure of zero. We therefore add a parameter dk,t to ensure that the market maker has a tendency to keep his net
holdings in A close to his initial endowment of zero. dk,t is calculated as Ak,t=100 with Ak,t denoting the holdings in
currency A at time t of period k.13 To achieve comparability to the other two treatments, the parameters of the market
makers are derived from Treatment OTC.14 With this treatment we mimic trading on market maker driven markets like in
some segments of the CME and LIFFE.
3. Econometric method
To avoid idiosyncratic effects of individual sessions we follow the approach of Plerou et al. (1999) and Kirchler and
Huber (2009) by normalizing log-returns (RETs,m,i). First we calculate the log-returns,
RETs,m,i ¼ lnðPs,m,iÞlnðPs,m,i1Þ, ð3Þ
where m indicates market and i stands for the individual transaction (tick). In a next step we normalize the log-returns by
their mean (RETs ) and standard deviation (sRETs ) in each session s
RETNORMs,m,i ¼ ðRETs,m,iRETs Þ=sRETs , ð4Þ
ABSRETNORMs,m,i ¼ 9ðRETs,m,iRETs Þ=sRETs 9: ð5Þ
Consequently, this normalization of returns (normalized returns, RETNORMs,m,i ) and of absolute returns (normalized
absolute returns, ABSRETNORMs,m,i ) allows pooling data of different markets (see the discussion in Plerou et al., 1999).
As excess kurtosis of the distribution of returns (absolute returns) is an ambiguous concept, it is common practice to
calculate exponents of empirical power laws as measures for the ‘‘fatness’’ of tails (see Hill, 1975). In the applied
economics literature the tail exponent for the 10%, 5%, and 2.5% tail of the distribution of absolute returns are usually
calculated. To arrive at these Hill estimators a the returns have to be put in descending order and the last x% are selected as
the ‘‘x% tail’’
a¼ 1Pm
j ¼ 1 lnðABSRETNORMnjþ1ÞlnðABSRETNORMnm Þ
m: ð6Þ12 We chose computerized market makers rather than human market makers as the former guarantee a constant ﬂow of liquidity to the market.
13 If, for example, his holdings in A are 10 units below the initial holdings of zero, he adds 0.1 to the bid and the ask to make his bids more attractive
for subjects to accept for selling. Consequently, the further away the current holdings in A are from the initial holdings the more aggressively a market
maker tries to bring his holdings in A back to a net position of zero.
14 For the waiting times between consecutive limit orders (WTLO) we apply a Weibull-distribution with a l of 6.0 and a constant of 0.87 (see Engle
and Russell, 1998; Politi and Scalas, 2008). For the quantity posted with each limit order a Poisson-distribution with a mean of 4.5 units of A ﬁts the
distribution in OTC best.
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corresponding tail of the distribution, j indicating observations of the tail, and n representing the total number of absolute
returns. One can see that the lower the tail exponent a, the fatter are the tails of the distribution.
Volatility clustering, the heteroscedasticity of a distribution, is measured and depicted by the autocorrelation function
(ACF) of absolute returns. Persistent positive ACF points to volatility clustering, while a quick decay of the ACF to zero
shows the absence of volatility clusters.
To arrive at statistical results for testing the fat-tail and volatility clustering properties of returns, we set up the
following panel regression model:
ym,p ¼ aþb1FTT_encompassingm,pþb2FTT_unilateralm,pþb3Tax_havenm,pþEm,p: ð7Þ
Here, ym,p is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables, m indicates cross-section (market) and p phase
(sequence of ﬁve consecutive periods in which a certain tax regime is applied). FTT_encompassing equals 1 when both
markets are taxed, zero otherwise. FTT_unilateral deﬁnes unilaterally taxed markets with the other market being untaxed
and Tax_haven is a binary dummy for the untaxed market when the other market is taxed. With Wald-coefﬁcient tests we
measure differences between the coefﬁcients (tax regimes). We apply clustered standard errors on a session level to allow
for correlation within sessions and independence of observations between sessions. As main dependent variables the Hill
Estimator for the 10%-tail (HILL_10) and the coefﬁcients of the autocorrelation function (ACF) of normalized absolute0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
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Fig. 1. Normalized returns as a function of trading time (in s) of representative sessions (‘‘L2’’: FTT_unilateral in market LEFT until period 6 followed by
FTT_encompassing until the end of the experiment) in treatments OTC (top left), TR (top right), and MM (bottom).
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–12661254returns (ACF_ABSRETNORMl ) for each market m and phase p are used. We refrain from estimating Eq. (7) with the Hill
estimators of the 5% and 2.5% tail, since sample size in individual markets, especially under tax regime FTT_unilateral is
too small.
4. Results
To provide a ﬁrst idea of return dynamics Fig. 1 gives an overview over the development of normalized returns as a
function of trading time for three representative sessions of the ‘‘L2’’-type. One can see more pronounced clusters of
volatility when an encompassing FTT is applied (i.e., in the second half of each market) and in the tax haven (i.e., market
RIGHT in the ﬁrst half of each market). Instead, hardly any clusters in volatility are visible in unilaterally taxed markets
(i.e., market LEFT in the ﬁrst half of each market).
4.1. Leptokurtosis
To test whether normalized returns are distributed Gaussian in each market and phase, we run both the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov and the Jarque–Bera test. For each subsample we reject the null hypothesis of Gaussian-distributed normalized
returns on the 1%-level with both tests.
To provide a visual impression of the impact of tax regime on the distribution of price changes, Fig. 2 plots the empirical
cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns (ABSRETNORMs,m,i ) for each tax regime of the aggregate0.05 0.1 0.5 1 2 3 4 5 10 20
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Fig. 2. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns of the four tax regimes. The dots represent the ECDF and the
solid lines approximate a normal distribution with same mean and variance. Tax regimes: no_FTT: both markets untaxed; FTT_unilateral: this market
taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing: both markets taxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other market taxed. For better clarity the
graphs only show the tails of the distribution (plots in Appendix provide the entire distribution).
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J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–1266 1255data set.15 One can see large outliers under each tax regime, as the probability of large price changes in the experiments is
much higher than would be expected by a normal distribution with same mean and standard deviation (solid line).
Importantly, a FTT has a strong impact on the fatness of the tails of the distribution. Unilaterally taxed markets (bottom
left) exhibit much fatter tails than markets under the other tax regimes. It is also worth mentioning that this pattern holds
for each treatment separately.16
Additionally, Fig. 3 shows the average Hill estimator of the 10% tail of normalized absolute returns for each treatment
and tax regime (HILL_10). To arrive at these values, the mean of the individual observations of each market and phase is
calculated. One can see that the average Hill estimators range from 2.3 to 4.3. There is also a clear tendency of tails being
fattest in unilaterally taxed markets and of tails being thinnest in tax havens. These estimates, with lower values denoting
fatter tails, are perfectly in line with empirically observed data which provide values between 2 and 6 (see Voit, 2003).
Table 2 shows the statistical tests according to Eq. (7).17 On aggregate, tails are fattest in unilaterally taxed markets
(FTT_unilateral) and signiﬁcantly larger compared to both the tax haven (Tax_haven) and when both markets are untaxed
(no_FTT). While the effect is strongest in Treatment MM, it is also evident in the other treatments.18
The reason for the very fat tails in unilaterally taxed markets in Treatments OTC and TR is that human subjects post
fewer limit orders and that volume is very low which makes large price changes (outliers) more likely. Table 3 provides
evidence on this liquidity and volume issue by using the same panel regression methodology as in Eq. (7) for the number
of limit orders posted (LO) and for trading volume (VOLUME). While there are no differences in LO in Treatment MMwhere
the computerized market makers post limit orders irrespective of tax regimes, we see clear effects, i.e. signiﬁcantly fewer
limit orders in unilaterally taxed markets of Treatments OTC and TR compared to both markets being untaxed (47% and
30%, respectively). Consequently, VOLUME is lowest in unilaterally taxed markets and highest in the tax haven in both
treatments. Therefore, in Treatments OTC and TR price outliers happen more easily under tax regime FTT_unilateral which
drives the value of the Hill Estimator down.
In Treatment MM the reason for the fatter tails in unilaterally taxed markets is different: while we also observe
signiﬁcantly fewer transactions, volatility measured by the standard deviation of normalized absolute returns is lowest
which is in contrast to the other treatments. Market makers keep liquidity constant and, as fewer limit orders are accepted
due to the unilateral imposition of the tax, order books become highly liquid. Hence, the price impact of market orders is
reduced as gaps between limit orders are narrowed. In the bottom panel of Fig. 4 the lower volatility under FTT_unilateral
in Treatment MM is evident as a lower mean, median, and standard deviation of normalized absolute returns.19 We further
observe that the share of returns of zero (i.e. unchanged prices) among all returns in unilaterally taxed markets in15 We provide ECDF-plots of each tax regime in each treatment to Appendix.
16 This provides ﬁrst evidence that fat tails are not primarily inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc market microstructure.
17 As a robustness check we run pairwise Mann–Whitney U-tests. One can see from Table A1 in Appendix that the results are perfectly in line with
those of our regression model in Table 2.
18 We ﬁnd no evidence of ordering effects of tax regimes in our results. This is mainly due to our balanced setting of tax regimes, since we implement
all possible permutations of ‘‘0’’, ‘‘2’’, and ‘‘L’’ across both market phases.
19 In this analysis, the average values of mean, median and standard deviation of normalized absolute returns in all phases of all markets are
calculated.
Table 3
Panel regression for limit orders (LO; top panel) and trading volume (VOLUME; bottom panel).
Aggregate OTC TR MM
LO
FTT_unilateral 41nnn (4.513) 90nnn (6.302) 59nnn (6.421) 10 (1.069)
FTT_encompassing 3 (0.515) 5 (0.389) 7 (0.568) 1 (0.143)
Tax_haven 28nnn (2.966) 77nnn (6.517) 58nnn (4.918) 7 (0.682)
c 292nnn (19.775) 190nnn (37.210) 200nnn (22.008) 389nnn (93.426)
N 192 48 48 96
VOLUME
FTT_unilateral 334nnn (5.597) 498nnn (3.133) 318nnn (3.441) 259nnn (3.875)
FTT_encompassing 39 (0.547) 77 (0.362) 17 (0.138) 110 (1.522)
Tax_haven 267nnn (3.796) 563nnn (4.360) 465nnn (3.344) 22 (0.330)
c 807nnn (16.028) 820nnn (7.337) 943nnn (8.571) 733nnn(11.377)
N 192 48 48 96
Independent variables: FTT_unilateral, this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing, both markets taxed; Tax_haven, this market
untaxed, but other market taxed. t-Values of a double-sided test are given in parentheses. Clustered standard errors to allow for correlation within
sessions and independence of observations between sessions are applied (‘‘vce (cluster varname)’’ method in STATA).
n, nn and nnn represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signiﬁcance levels.
Table 2
Panel regression for the 10% tail of the Hill estimator (HILL_10).
Aggregate OTC TR MM
FTT_unilateral 0.442nn (2.063) 0.340 (0.584) 0.192 (0.387) 0.608nnn (2.721)
FTT_encompassing 0.175 (0.954) 0.020 (0.041) 0.262 (0.819) 0.201 (0.950)
Tax_haven 0.460 (0.958) 1.664 (0.914) 0.417 (0.955) 0.116 (0.542)
c 2.931nnn (22.715) 2.662nnn (8.491) 2.689nnn (9.847) 3.180nnn (22.925)
N 192 48 48 96
Pairwise Wald-tests
FTT_encompassing Tax_haven
Aggregate
FTT_unilateral 1.18 (0.278) 3.89nn (0.049)
FTT_encompassing 1.93 (0.165)
OTC
FTT_unilateral 0.28 (0.597) 1.64 (0.201)
FTT_encompassing 0.86 (0.354)
TR
FTT_unilateral 0.02 (0.894) 0.63 (0.426)
FTT_encompassing 2.65 (0.104)
MM
FTT_unilateral 2.04 (0.154) 2.20 (0.138)
FTT_encompassing 0.17 (0.682)
Top panel. Independent variables: FTT_unilateral, this market taxed, but other market untaxed;
FTT_encompassing, both markets taxed; Tax_haven, this market untaxed, but other market taxed. t-Values of a
double-sided test are given in parentheses. Clustered standard errors to allow for correlation within sessions and
independence of observations between sessions are applied (‘‘vce (cluster varname)’’ method in STATA).
n, nn and nnn represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signiﬁcance levels.
Bottom panel. Pairwise Wald-tests: Chi2-values and p-values (in parenthesis) are provided.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–12661256Treatment MM is 26.5% and thus higher than in any other tax regime. While the lower overall volatility level is evident, the
ratio of standard deviation to the mean of normalized absolute returns is 1.5 in unilaterally taxed markets, compared to 1.2
in the other three tax regimes. Thus, in addition to more low and zero-returns we also observe relatively more outliers
(which drives up standard deviation) in unilaterally taxed markets than in any other tax regime of Treatment MM.2020 In addition, we observe that the tail of the distribution of negative normalized absolute returns is fattest in unilaterally taxed markets in all
treatments. The same holds when we focus solely on the ‘‘positive tail’’ of normalized absolute returns. Again, tails are fattest in unilaterally taxed
markets compared to all other tax regimes in all treatments.
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To explore the extent of volatility clustering in a market it is the established method to look at the autocorrelation
function of absolute returns, as persistent positive correlations hint at clusters in volatility. In a ﬁrst step, the ACF-
coefﬁcient of normalized absolute returns for lag l and market phase p of market m is calculated. Then, to arrive at
ACF_ABSRETNORMl , we compute the mean coefﬁcient value for each tax regime and lag l.
Fig. 5 provides a graphical overview of volatility clustering on aggregate and for each treatment separately by showing
the autocorrelation function (ACF) of normalized absolute returns (ACF_ABSRETNORMl ) conditional on tax regime.
Additionally, Table 4 presents statistical tests according to Eq. (7).21 On aggregate, one can see a clear pattern of volatility
clustering being strongest in the tax havens (Tax_haven). Compared to other tax regimes the ACF of normalized absolute
returns is highest for each lag and decays only from 0.27 at lag one to 0.08 at lag ten. The second- and third-highest
autocorrelations at each lag are present when both markets are untaxed (no_FTT) and in markets with an encompassing
FTT (FTT_encompassing), respectively. In contrast to the tax havens, the ACF of unilaterally taxed markets (FTT_unilateral)
quickly decays and is signiﬁcantly smaller than the ACF of most of the other tax regimes at each lag. We attribute this21 For better clarity we provide only statistical tests for the aggregate data up to lag ﬁve.
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Fig. 5. Autocorrelation function (ACF) of normalized absolute returns for the aggregate data (top left) and for each treatment separately. Tax regimes:
no_FTT: both markets untaxed; FTT_unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing: both markets taxed; Tax_haven: this
market untaxed, but other market taxed.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–12661258again to the lowered trading frequency in unilaterally taxed markets in all treatments: with fewer transactions times of
hectic trading with several transactions per second, which are the main volatility clusters in our markets, almost never
occur and thus autocorrelation of absolute returns is much lower.22 The regressions for limit orders (LO) and trading
volume (VOLUME) in Table 3 and the analysis of the average waiting time between consecutive trades (WTT) per phase p
corroborate this line of argumentation. With an average WTT of 13.5 s trading frequency is very low in unilaterally taxed
markets compared to tax havens with an average WTT of 4.9 s. Unsurprisingly, the WTT of tax regimes FTT_encompassing
(7.6) and no_FTT (6.5) are in between.235. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented data from laboratory experiments to study the impact of a ﬁnancial transaction tax
(FTT) on stylized facts of price returns. In particular, a FTT was introduced in none, one or both of two simultaneously
running double auction markets for the same currency pair. We set up three treatments to get a broader picture of
differences between tax regimes in different market microstructures with different parameters.
We found that the distribution of normalized absolute returns is fat-tailed under each tax regime. The following results
hold for each treatment separately: (i) fat tails were largest and signiﬁcantly bigger in unilaterally taxed markets22 See French and Roll (1986) and Dichev et al. (2011) for empirical evidence.
23 The patterns of WTT are very similar for each treatment separately and thus we only report aggregate data.
Table 4
Panel regression of the autocorrelation function (ACF) of normalized absolute returns (ACF_ABSRETNORMl ) for lags 1–5 of the aggregate data set.
lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 4 lag 5
FTT_unilateral 0.005 (0.121) 0.075nnn (2.802) 0.097nnn (4.027) 0.054nn (2.527) 0.016 (0.568)
FTT_encompassing 0.004 (0.161) 0.015 (0.744) 0.021 (1.030) 0.032nn (2.167) 0.015 (0.937)
Tax_haven 0.050n (1.958) 0.032 (1.113) 0.032 (1.269) 0.065nnn (2.799) 0.076nnn (3.085)
c 0.216nnn (12.428) 0.156nnn (11.641) 0.125nnn (8.213) 0.098nnn (8.191) 0.084nnn (5.863)
N 185 185 185 185 185
Pairwise Wald-tests
FTT_encompassing Tax_haven
lag 1
FTT_unilateral 0.00 (0.976) 2.45 (0.118)
FTT_encompassing 3.96nn (0.047)
lag 2
FTT_unilateral 4.95nn (0.026) 13.01nnn (0.000)
FTT_encompassing 3.41n (0.065)
lag 3
FTT_unilateral 9.41nnn (0.002) 20.02nnn (0.000)
FTT_encompassing 4.47nn (0.034)
lag 4
FTT_unilateral 1.03 (0.309) 20.44nnn (0.000)
FTT_encompassing 21.02nnn (0.000)
lag 5
FTT_unilateral 0.000 (0.959) 10.62nnn (0.001)
FTT_encompassing 15.96nnn (0.000)
Top panel. Independent variables: FTT_unilateral, this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing, both markets taxed; Tax_haven, this
market untaxed, but other market taxed. t-values of a double-sided test are given in parentheses. Clustered standard errors to allow for correlation within
sessions and independence of observations between sessions are applied (‘‘vce(cluster varname)’’ method in STATA).
n, nn and nnn represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signiﬁcance levels.
Bottom panel. Pairwise Wald-Tests: Chi2-values and p-values (in parenthesis) are provided.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–1266 1259compared to most other tax regimes. As usually observed in real-world markets we also found clustered volatility in
untaxed markets and in markets with an encompassing FTT, while the clusters disappeared in unilaterally taxed markets.
In particular, (ii) tax havens showed the strongest volatility clusters since the autocorrelation function (ACF) was highest at
each lag compared to the other tax regimes. In contrast, (iii) the ACF of normalized absolute returns decayed very quickly
towards zero in unilaterally taxed markets in each treatment. This ﬁnding can be attributed to the low trading frequency in
unilaterally taxed markets, since times of hectic trading, which are the main volatility clusters in our markets, almost
never occur. Notably, (iv) we observed hardly any changes in both variables when an encompassing FTT was applied
compared to both markets being untaxed.
To address the question whether human behavior or the market microstructure (or a combination of both) causes these
differences in stylized facts is difﬁcult with this setting (see Bottazzi et al., 2006; Anufriev and Panchenko, 2009 for related
studies). However, we observe very similar dynamics in stylized facts conditional on tax regime across different market
microstructures. Therefore we indirectly infer that human behavior mainly drives the results, as they react similarly to tax
regimes irrespective of the market microstructure applied.
The results presented here are not only relevant for scientists, interested in speciﬁc statistical properties of returns.
Especially investors, regulators, and politicians should also care: Fatter tails under a FTT mean more extreme tail events,
e.g. large drops in asset prices. A measure for the fatness of tails should thus be a key variable in risk management and
changes of this variable should be taken into account by risk managers and regulators. Similarly, the pricing of options and
structured products depends on the underlying distribution of returns. With extreme events becoming more likely options,
similar derivatives and structured products that ‘‘insure’’ tail events, become more expensive. Volatility clustering, though
sometimes considered ‘‘bad’’ when right in the middle of such a cluster, allows to predict future volatility to a certain
(small) degree. The lack of volatility clusters – as evident in our unilaterally taxed markets – thus means that ﬁnancial
professionals lose the little forecasting power they had with respect to volatility. Thus, we urge that any nation should
tread carefully when contemplating the unilateral introduction of a FTT, as the costs for anyone trying to insure (with
options and similar derivatives) would likely go up, while predictability of future volatility, small as it was, would
decrease. Instead, a universal (encompassing) implementation of a FTT would have hardly any negative effects on the fat
tail and the volatility clustering property compared to the current status quo. The latter implies that international
coordination for implementing FTTs is a necessary condition to avoid distorting effects for the distribution of returns.
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Fig. A1. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns of the four tax regimes across the three treatments. The dots
represent the ECDF and the solid lines approximate a normal distribution with same mean and variance. Tax regimes: no_FTT: both markets untaxed;
FTT_unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing: both markets taxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other
market taxed.
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Appendix A. Additional tables and ﬁgures
Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns of the four tax regimes across the
treatments are given in Figs. A1–A4.
Appendix B. Instructions for treatments OTC, TR and MM24
Background of the experiment: In this experiment on currency trading 16 traders (8 human traders and2 computerized market
makers) can trade currency A and currency B (B is the home currency) in two independent markets (called LEFT and RIGHT).24 Instructions and screenshots are for Treatment OTC, text changes in Treatment TR are in (bold), text changes in Treatment MM are in (italic).
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Fig. A2. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns of the four tax regimes in Treatment OTC. The dots represent
the ECDF and the solid lines approximate a normal distribution with same mean and variance. Tax regimes: no_FTT: both markets untaxed;
FTT_unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing: both markets taxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other market
taxed. For better clarity the graphs only show the tails of the distribution.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–1266 1261Market properties: Initial endowment: Half of the (human) traders start with 75 units A and 1500 units B, while the other half of the
(human) traders start with 25 units A and 4500 units B. There are two markets where the currencies can be traded—markets LEFT and RIGHT.
 On every market, one computerized market maker quotes sell and buy offers to which the currency A can be bought or sold.
 No interest is paid on any currency.
 The prices in the two markets can deviate.Trading requirements: One half of the traders is subject to trading requirements in the amount of 1000 in B, i.e.
eight subjects are forced to fulﬁll a trading volume of 1000 in each period. For subjects who fail to execute their
trading requirements a penalty of 500 in B for each period is assessed. Four traders are liable to their trading
requirements on market LEFT, while the other four traders are forced to fulﬁll their trading requirements on market
RIGHT. The rest of the traders are not subject to trading requirements. The trading requirements is fulﬁled when the
holding of open trading requirements (ﬁeld ‘‘open trading commitments’’) at the trading screen shows ‘‘1’’.
Fundamental value of currency A: The fundamentally justiﬁed value – fundamental value need not equal the price – of
currency A (expressed in units of currency B) is the value that would result from a full and fair analysis of the currency. In
reality it depends on micro- and macroeconomic variables. In our market the fundamental value of A (expressed in units of B)
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Fig. A3. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns of the four tax regimes in Treatment TR. The dots represent the
ECDF and the solid lines approximate a normal distribution with same mean and variance. Tax regimes: no_FTT: both markets untaxed; FTT_unilateral:
this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing: both markets taxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other market taxed. For
better clarity the graphs only show the tails of the distribution.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–12661262is modeled as a stochastic process
FVk ¼ FVk1  egk ,
where FVk stands for the fundamental value in period k and gk is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of 5%. The fundamental value in the current period it thus the best estimate of the fundamental
value in the next period.
Information on the fundamental value of currency A: Each period each subject receives a private signal (SIGNAL) on the
fundamental value of currency A (expressed in units of currency B). This signal can be above or below the actual
fundamental value with equal probability. Most signals are close to the true fundamental value, as only an error term with
an expected value of zero and a standard deviation of 2.5% is added to the fundamental value.
Calculating total wealth: Your total wealth (expressed in units of B) is comprised of the value of your holdings in A (units
of A multiplied by the last price) plus the holdings of B. For valuing A the last price is used.
Wealth¼ ðunits Anprice AÞþunits B:
If prices in the two markets deviate, the current price with the higher trading volume is used.
Important details: Each trading period lasts 240 s, i.e. 4 min.
 The experiment lasts between 8 and 14 periods with equal termination probability in each period.
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Fig. A4. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of normalized absolute returns of the four tax regimes in Treatment MM. The dots represent
the ECDF and the solid lines approximate a normal distribution with same mean and variance. Tax regimes: no_FTT: both markets untaxed;
FTT_unilateral: this market taxed, but other market untaxed; FTT_encompassing: both markets taxed; Tax_haven: this market untaxed, but other market
taxed. For better clarity the graphs only show the tails of the distribution.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–1266 1263 Your payment in Euro depends on your total wealth at the end of the experiment. Your holdings of A will be valued at
their fundamental value (not price!) of the last period. The ﬁnal payment is calculated as follows:
Final wealth¼ ðunits Anfundamental valueÞþunits B,
Payment¼ Final wealth=400:Example: units A: 30, fundamental value of A: 70, units B: 3900.Final wealth¼ ð30n70Þþ3900¼ 6000,
Payment¼ 6000=400¼ 15 Euro:
Trading: All subjects can buy and sell currencies at any time. This can be done on the LEFT or RIGHT market—switching between
markets is free and causes no extra costs. Short selling (negative holdings) is possible up to an amount of 100 A and
6.000 B. The volume of each transaction is limited to 20 units of A, but trading volume within a period is unlimited. Each period subjects can enter as many BIDs and ASKs (between 1 and 99) as they want—again without restrictions on
the LEFT and RIGHT market. (The BIDs and ASKs are set exclusively by the2 computerized market makers, who are
Table A1
Robustness check for the fat tail property of normalized absolute returns: Pairwise Mann–Whitney U-tests for the 10% tail of the Hill estimator (HILL_10).
FTT_unilateral FTT_encompassing Tax_haven
Aggregate
no_FTT 2.145nn (0.032) 0.586 (0.558) 1.034 (0.301)
FTT_unilateral 1.718n (0.086) 2.672nnn (0.008)
FTT_encompassing 1.710n (0.087)
OTC
no_FTT 0.857 (0.391) 0.000 (1.000) 0.551 (0.582)
FTT_unilateral 0.612 (0.540) 1.050 (0.294)
FTT_encompassing 0.674 (0.500)
TR
no_FTT 0.919 (0.358) 0.754 (0.451) 0.857 (0.391)
FTT_unilateral 0.429 (0.668) 1.365 (0.172)
FTT_encompassing 1.531 (0.126)
MM
no_FTT 2.296nn (0.022) 0.524 (0.601) 0.372 (0.710)
FTT_unilateral 1.903n (0.057) 2.450nn (0.014)
FTT_encompassing 1.094 (0.274)
n, nn and nnn represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signiﬁcance levels.
The numbers represent z-values and p-values (in parenthesis) of a double-sided Mann–Whitney U-test.
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–12661264completely independent from each other. Each computerized market maker quotes on average every6 s a sell and buy offer
simultaneously, whereas he orientates his quotes on the last trading price.) IMPORTANT: The price of the currencies is set exclusively by you and the other subjects in the market by supply and
demand.The trading screen looks as follows:
J. Huber et al. / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 36 (2012) 1248–1266 1265The trading screen looks as follows:
After each trading period a history screen is shown for 10 s to provide you with information on what happened in the
market:
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